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ON TRADEMARKS, DOMAIN NAMES,
AND INTERNAL AUCTIONS
Gideon Parchomovsky*

The first-in-time priority rule for appropriation of domain
names has deprived various established businesses of the ability to use
their valuable trademarks as their domain names. Many firms have
seen their trademarks registered as domain names by "cybersquat
ters" -individuals who register famous marks for the purpose of re
selling them at a higher price to their owners-while others have
watched smaller businesses win the registration race. The inability of
established firms to use their trademark as their domain name im
poses high costs not only on the firms, but also on Internet users who
are forced to bear higher search costs when transacting on-line.
Two legal solutions have emerged in response to this problem.
In 1999, Congress enacted the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protec
tion Act, establishing a new cause of action against cybersquatting. In
addition, the International Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (JCANN) -the entity responsible for assigning domain
names- has instituted rules for arbitration of domain name disputes.
Central to both solutions is the "good-faith" standard: if the domain
name registrant acted in good faith, she should retain the domain
name.
In this essay, Professor Parchomovsky argues that neither solu
tion provides an adequate mechanism for resolving disputes over
domain names. Both solutions are unnecessarily expensive and time
consuming, and neither guarantees the efficient allocation of domain
names. A superior solution would be an asymmetric internal auction
system to resolve domain-name disputes. The auction mechanism
would ensure that the disputed domain·name ends up in the hands of
its highest value user, while granting just compensation to the other
party. Furthermore, it accomplishes this result instantaneously and at
negligible cost.
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INTRODUCTION

The rapid evolution of the Internet into a principal medium of
commerce has taken many established businesses by surprise, leaving
them out of step with the new reality. As these heavy-hitting, yet slow
moving giants have finally awakened, they have discovered- much to
their dismay-that they can no longer register their vaunted trademarks
as domain names. Cyberprospectors, and other smaller business enter
prises have beaten them to the registry. This "fliSt come, first served"
priority rule has substantially disadvantaged many established corpora
tions, forcing them to buy back the right to use marks and symbols they
labored to develop, or adopt a different, less recognizable, domain name.
Examples are legion. Giant multi-billion-dollar businesses, such as
Apple Computer,1 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,2 Federal Ex
press,3 and the World Wrestling Federation4 have been forced to find a
way to wrestle their trademarks from the hands of entrepreneurial indi
viduals who recognized the potential of e-commerce slightly ahead of
them. Even the New York Yankees, Major League Baseball's world
champions in four out of the last five baseball seasons, fell behind, at
least in the first inning, in their "match" against Brian McKiernan, a
forty-one-year-old fan, who registered the domain name <newyorkyan
kees.com>.'
Some of these businesses managed to rebound with relative ease. In
the case of Apple Computer, for example, the mere threat of a trade
mark infringement suit sufficed to prompt the domain name appropria
tor, a sixteen-year-old Canadian teenager, to renounce ownership of the
domain name <www.appleimac.com>.6 Other companies were less for
tunate. Compaq Computer Corporation had to pay $3.35 million for the

1.

See Patrick McGeehan & Man Richtel, What's in a Web Addreu? Maybe a Lawsuit, N.Y.

TIMES, Oet. 22, 1999, at AI.
2. See id.
3.

See linda Rosencrance, FedEx Domain Suit Filed; Suggested: Dostana Enterprises Says It

Want; to .Ramn me Right to Us;: "waddtmtime.wrn·, Cviftl'UieR WORLD, Feb. 14, 2006, ii 4.
4. See Jery Causing, Wrestling Group WillS Back Use of Its Name on Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2000, at C4. The dispute was ultimately resolved through arbitration. See WWF WillS Domain

Name TraiiSfer in First ICANN Arbitration, ANDREWS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. Lmo. REP.,
Mar. 7, 2000, at 9; M. Scott Donahey & RyanS. Hilbert, Case Note, World Wrestling Federation En·
tertainment, Inc. v. Michael Bosman: A Legal Body Slam for CybersqUiltters on the Web, 16SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. W.419,421 •2000).
S. See New York Yankees v. McKiernan, No. 99-CV-8449 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 23, 1999): see
also Mary Huhn, Yanks Sue QIIS. Fan; Boss Wants His Website, N.Y. POST, Dec. 29, 1999, at 34; Neil
MacFarquhar, ThoSI! DomifiDnl Yankees F18hl for a Domain Name, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6. 2000, at B3.
Other famous oommerdal entities and organizations that found themselves in a similar predicament
include, inter alia, the sponsors of America's Cup yacht race; the National Football League; Easter
man Kodak Co.; QVC Inc., the home-shopping network; and Harvard University. See Debra Baker,
Standing Up to CybenqUilllers: Judges Are Seizing on New Legislation to Keep Web Sire Pirates From
Taking a Name for Themselves, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 18, 18-19.
6. See McGeehan & Ri chtel supra note l, at At.
,
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right to use the domain name <altavista.com>.7 Faring a little better,
McDonald's consented to wire a high school to the Internet in considera
tion for the domain name <www.mcdonalds.com>.8 Other corporations,
such as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.9 and Panavision,10 reached an
impasse in their negotiations with the domain·name holders and had to
resort to litigation to obtain the right to use their trademarks as domain
names.
'Trademark owners,· however, are not the only group harmed by the
first-in-time rule that governs allocation of domain names. A second,
widely overlooked, group of ·victims are the conSumers of the trademark
owners, who are deprived of the cheapest, and least time consuming, way
of transacting on-line. Unab�e to find businesses where they expect
using the trademark or the business's name as a domain name-millions
of consumers are forced to engage in treacherous and time-consuming
"term searches" in order to find the merchandise or services they seek to
purchase;
·

To alleviate the plight of the trademark owners and their consum
ers, President Clinton signed into law the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA) on November 29, 1 999 1 1 The act amended sec
tion 43(d) of the Lanham Act to 'create a cause of action against cyber
squattingP The act defines cybersquatting as a bad-faith attempt to
profit, register, or traffic in a domain name that at the time of its registra
tion was identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive or famous trade
mark.13
·

.

In a similar vein, the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy (UDRP), promulgated by the International Corpora
tion for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), adopts bad faith as the
linchpin of its scheme.14 Specifically, paragraph 4(a)(iii) of UDRP de
fines "applicable disputes" as ones in which the domain-name registrant
appropriated in bad faith a name identical or confusingly similar to the
complainant's trademark.1s

1.

Se£ Compaq and A!taVi.ita Seide lr.:ar.ct AddscN Di.Jpu:e, WAU.. ST. J., JuJy29, 1998, ca Bl2;

Aaron W. Brooks, The Cawious Interplay Between Tradefl1llrks and Interne/ Domain Names,
88Iu.. B.J. 74, 74 (2000).
8. See The Early Show: CybtrsqU4lters Come Unckr Fire (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 16,
1999), available aJ1999 WL 16015902 [hereinafter The Early Show] .
9. See McGeehan & Richtel, supra note 1, at Al.
The disputed domain name
< www.m.sdw.com> now serves as Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.'s home page.
10. See Panavision lnt'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that de·
fendant's actions violated trademark laws).
ll. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999).
12. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 112S(d) (West Supp. 2000).
13. See id. § 112S(d)(l)(A).
14. See ICANN, Uniform Domain Nome Displlle Reso/Ulion Policy, Dl http:l/www.icann.org/udrp
/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last updated June 4, 2000) (hereinafter UDRP] (on file with the University
see also

of Illinois Law Review}.
15. Jd. t 4(a) ( iii).
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Although these solutions are a step in the right direction, they are
hardly satisfactory. First, neither approach provides a comprehensive so
lution to the problem. Second, and more importantly, the reliance of
both solutions on the good faith of the domain-name registrant is welfare
diminishing relative to other alternatives that could-and in my opinion,
should-have been adopted.
The ACPA is incomplete because it only covers conflicts in which
the trademark preceded the domain name; only trademark owners whose
marks were famous or distinctive at the time of the domain name's regis
tration can take advantage of the new anticybersquatting cause of ac
tion.16 Yet, given the rate of appropriation of domain names, it is quite
likely that future conflicts will involve trademark owners who developed
a distinctive or famous mark after the registration of the domain name
that is, conflicts between first-in-time domain-name registrants and later
in-time trademark owners. Secondly, the act only applies to trademarks
that were famous, distinctive, or registered nationally at the time of the
domain name registration.�' Marks that gained the required status at
some later time are not covered by the Bill. The UDRP avoids these
problems but it is inexhaustive as it allows the parties to opt out at any
time during the arbitration process and litigate instead.18 Moreover, any
decision of the arbitration panel can be appealed to a court of law.19
More importantly, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, the
reliance on good faith is problematic for two principal reasons. First,
good faith is a notoriously fuzzy standard, infamous for breeding uncer
tainty. Consequently, it impairs the ability of both trademark and do
main-name owners to ascertain the status and strength of their respective
entitlements vis-a-vis one another. Second, the good-faith standard does
not guarantee an efficient allocation of resources. Economic efficiency
concerns itself with the efficient allocation of resources. More particu
larly, it seeks to ensure that resources wind up in the hands of the highest
value users.20 Accordingly, in a dispute between a trademark holder and
a domain-name registrant, economic efficiency prescribes that the party
who values the domain name more highly should ultimately get it, inde
pendently of whether the domain-name registrant acted in good faith.

16. See 15 U.S.CA. § 1125(d)(l)(A){ii)(l)-(II) (stating that for a cause of action to accrue, a
must be "distinctive" or "famous« the time of registration of the domain name") (emphasis
added).
17. It must be noted that it is often difficult to delerm.ine whether a mark is sufficiently famous

mark

or distinctive. As one commentator points out, "Coca-Cola may present no problem, but what hap
pens when the Acme Fertilizer Co. wants the same address as the Acme Fertility Clinic Co. 1" John
Gi beaut Staking an Internet Claim: The Rush to Grab a Site Nanu Has Led to New Rules, But No One
to Enforce Them, A.B.A. J July 1999, at 82, 82.
18. See UDRP, supra note 14,! 4(k).
,

.,

19.

Seeid
See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-17 (5th ed.
value, utility. and efficiency).

20.

1998)

(discussing
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A simple example may help illustrate this point. Assume that Char
lie Klein, an astute student at the University of Illinois College of Law,
registers the domain name <ck.com>. Charlie's appropriation of the
name clearly imposes a cost on Calvin Klein who now has to adopt and
advertise a new name. Furthermore, Charlie's use of the domain name
imposes a considerable cost on Calvin's consumers. Thus, economic effi
ciency requires that Calvin Klein get the domain name. Yet, neither the
ACPA nor UDRP guarantee this result: Charlie's initials potentially
immunize him against any legal action by the trademark owner.
One might argue, though, that this result should not worry us. Pri
vate bargaining between the parties would ensure the efficient outcome.
As Coase demonstrated, in a world without transaction costs legal enti
tlements are irrelevant.21 Alas, the Coasean world in which transacting is
cost-free is very far from the real world-especially, insofar as the pre
sent context is concerned. Bargaining between domain-name registrants
and trademark owners presents the problem of bilateral monopoly.22 In
such negotiations there is only one buyer and only one seller, and conse
quently, the price of the transaction is indeterminable, ex ante. Knowing
that the other party must transact with her, or not at all, each of the par
ties to the negotiation will assay to extract as much of the bargaining sur
p lus as possible-a strategy that dramatically increases transaction costs,
as well as the likelihood of negotiation breakdown.23 Therefore, private
negotiation between the parties may not, in general, be relied upon to ef
fect an efficient allocation of domain names. Moreover, even when such
negotiation does result in an efficient outcome, the cost of attaining this
outcome-i.e., the transaction cost-is likely to be quite significant.
An efficient way to overcome the bilateral monopoly problem, and
ensure that the domain name ends up in the hand of its higher value user,
is provided by auction theory. The virtue of auctions lies in their ability
to force parties to reveal private information, thereby eliminating the in·
centive to negotiate strategically. Thus, auctions can guarantee the effi.
cient allocation of resources when standard negotiations fail. Drawing

21. S� Ronald H. Cuai(:, The Fwbl<:m uf Scx:iul Cost, 3 j,L. &. EcoN. i, 2-6 (i9<i0}.
22. For a comprehensive review of the literature on strategic barriers to bilateral negotiation, see
Robert Cooter. The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 23 (19112) (pointing out that disagreements as
to how to divide th e contractual surplus may prevent successful Coasean bargaining); John Kennan &.
Robert Wilson, Bargaining with Private Information, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 46 (1993) (hypothe
sizing that differences in private information are a primary cause of bargaining delays); Robert P.
Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and lntellecJUQ/ Propeny, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2659 (1994)
(observing that in tbe field of intellectual property the valuation problem heightens the possibility of
strategic bargaining); Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Meclumism Design, and the Liqui
dated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L REv. 1195, 1198, 1219 (1994) (discussi ng the problem of bilateral
monopoly in contract renegotiation).
23. The negotialion between the National Football League, widely known as "The NFL," and
"NFL Today," a gambling site, provides an illuminating example. The NFL offered to pay $270 for
the disputed domain names, and NFL Today countered by asking for $120,000 . See Jon A. Baumgar
ten et al., Washington Walch: Recently Enacted Antieybersquatting LegislaJion Is Basis of LaW$uia,
CYBERSPACE LAW., Jan. 2000, at 17.
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on auction theory, I propose that disputes between trademark and do
main-name owners be resolved through an asymmetric internal auction
in which the domain name will be auctioned off between the parties. The
auction may be initiated by any of the parties unilaterally, and will pro
ceed in two stages: First, the auction administrator will screen out do
main-name registrants for eligibility. The screening test to be applied is
added value. Only registrants who add independent value to the name
by actively using it in trade should be eligible to enter the auction. Reg
istrants who do not add value- widely known as "warehousers" and "cy
bersquatters" -are essentially free riders who seek to capitalize on the
trademark owner's investment in goodwill, without generating any social
benefit. Because this behavior is socially undesirable, the law should dis
courage it by restoring the names to their trademark owners who made
them valuable.
Second, the domain name will be auctioned off between the do
main-name registrant and the trademark owner in a closed bid auction.
The auction will proceed according to the following rules:24
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid.
(b) If the trademark owner submits the higher bid, she will get
the domain name for a price equal to the bid of the domain-name
registrant.
(c) If, by contrast, the domain-name owner submits the higher
bid, she will retain the domain name but she will have to pay the
amount of her bid to the trademark owner.
(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal
ienable for a period of two years.
As I will demonstrate, these rules provide each of the parties with
an incentive to submit a bid that closely approximates her private valua
tion of the domain name. The trademark owner, who presumably values
the name more highly, but fears "extortion," will reveal her true valua
tion, because the price she will have to pay does not depend on the bid
she submits. Admittedly, the domain-name registrant will not reveal her
true valuation; rather, she will shade her bid up somewhat. Yet, her stra
tegic ability to exaggerate her valuation is capped by the fear that she
might end up paying the amount of her bid and the requirement to post a
bond in this amount. Excessively raising the bid is a self-defeating strat
egy for the domain-name owner because the bid amount may tum out to
be the price she ultimately pays. Under the proposed mechanism, the
domain-name registrant cannot be sure, ex ante, whether she will end up
receiving or paying her bid. Consequently, she will be cautious not to
overplay her cards. Thus, as long as the parties bid rationally, at the con
clusion of the auction, the domain name will reach the party who values

24.

For discussion of alternative auction rules, see infra Part

IV.C.
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it more. Moreover, the proposed auction accomplishes this result at a
negligible cost without need for extensive negotiation or litigation.
II. WHAT'S IN A [DOMAIN) NAME?
Slightly rephrased, Shakespeare's rhetorical question of almost five
centuries ago, "what's in a name?"25 can be succinctly answered. When
the term "domain" is inserted right before "name" the answer is straight
forward: a lot. Indeed, very few assets have increased in value and
commercial importance as rapidly as domain names. The domain name
<business.com> was recently auctioned off for $7.5 million26 and
<wine.com> for the more "modest" amount of $3 million.27 Perhaps
even more astounding is the rate at which domain names are being ap
propriated.28 In 1999, new domain names were claimed and registered at
a rate of 300,000 per month.29 Yet, if one pauses to reflect, she will find
out that this trend is completely justifiable.
The meteoric ascent of domain names is inextricably related to the
ascent of the Internet as a primary medium of commerce.30 Metaphori
cally speaking, domain names are the traffic signs of the Internet. With
out them, the Internet would not be an "information superhighway," at
least not insofar as e-commerce is concerned. As was the case with many
other valuable resources in the history of American property, domain
name appropriation has been governed by the first-in-time rule.:ll Unfor-

25.
2000).

26.
27.

WlWAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET

210 (Jill Levinson ed., Oxford Univ. Press

See The Early Show, supra note 8.

See CBS Evening News: Competilion Over Reserving Domain Names on the Internet (CBS
television broadcast, Nov. 7, 1999) [hereinafter CBS Evening News). It is interesting to note that nei
ther the term «business" nor the term "wine" CQuld be claimed as trademarks because both terms are
generic. They C<luld, and indeed were, registered as domain names because those limitations applica
ble to trademarks do not apply to domain names. Indeed, for this very reason generic words make the
most valuable domain names: they are highly valuable because of their simplicity and registering them
does not run the risk of being sued by a disgruntled trademark owner.
28. Having realized that 70% of the population of the U.S. shares one of only 9,000 last names,
Jerry Sumpton, a Canadian entrepreneur, teamed up with a group of investors, and registered the
na�� of QVer 60% <�f the popul!'tion. See �ott Woolley, !mem� M!UtU of Yaw Dc�P.ai.>t: Wan1 :o
R(!S(f!;I'Vf! Yow Surn411W em rhe Net? TiXJ l..ate-A Firm You Nt:��er lleard of Probably Owns II,
FORBES, July 26, 1999, at 244.
29. See CBS Evening News, supra note 27. To date, almost 33 million domain names have been
registered worldwide, with the vast majority, over 20 million, in the .com Top Level Domain. See
NETNAMES, LATEST DoMAIN STATS, at http://www.netnames.C<lm (last updated Dec. 6, 2000) (on file
with the Universily of Illinois l..aw Review).
30. The numbers are staggering. The International Data Corp. estimates that the Internet econ
omy will reach $3 trillion by 2003. See Int'l Data Corp., /DC Expects the Worldwide Internet Economy
ro Exceed $1 Trillion b)' 2001, at http://www.idc.com/Datallnternet/content/NETll0399PRhtm (Nov.
3, 1999 ) (on file with the University of Illinois Law Rt:��iew). As one commentator noted, this figure
"may well translate into an ever-increasing demand for domain names." Latifa Mitchell-Stephens,
ICANN Expands Donutin Name Landscape, E-CoMMERCE, Mar. 2000, at 1 (on file with the University
of Illinois Law Review).
31. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & ]AMES KRIER, PROPERTY

sizing the importance of the C<lncept of first occupancy or possession).

14-15 (4th ed.l998) (empha
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tunately, in the rush to allocate domain names to first comers, policy
makers completely ignored the obvious tension between this rule of ap
propriation and trademark protection. For a modest fee of $70, any legal
entity can register any previously unregistered domain name it desires;
no other restrictions apply. As a result, cyberprospectors could register
for themselves the trademarks of many established companies and even
famous individuals.32 Slowly getting a grip on the new commercial real
ity, those businesses are forced to choose among three undesirable op
tions: (1) negotiate a consensual transfer of the domain name; (2) litigate
the matter; or (3) adopt a brand-new domain name.33 I discuss these op
tions in reverse order.
A.

Creating a New Domain Name

The option of adopting a new domain name is highly unattractive to
most businesses. From the vantage point of trademark owners, this
strategy implicates two types of costs-both of them quite substantial.
The first is the cost of establishing a new domain name; the second is the
cost of ceding control of a trademark to a third party.
Establishing a new domain name inv�lves two distinct, yet related,
challenges: finding an appropriate domain name and introducing it to
the market place. Finding a fitting domain name is likely to be an ex
tremely difficult task. For a domain name to serve its purpose -creating
a means of communication with consumers-it must be associated with
the company's products or image, and, in addition, it must be sufficiently
easy to remember and use. The challenge of finding the proper name is
exacerbated by the high rate of appropriation of domain names. If ini
tially it was relatively easy to adopt substitute names, marketable names
are now very difficult to find. Cybersquatters have already appropriated
most valuable domain names, and businesses seeking to adopt a new
name will in all likelihood have to negotiate a consensual agreement with
the name's appropriator.
Even if the challenge of selecting a new name is successfully over
come, businesses engaging in this enterprise will have to bear the cost of
introducing the new domain name to the market.

Introducing a new

domain name to the market typically necessitates massive expenditures
on advertising in order to instill the new domain name in the consumer
consciousness. It bears emphasis that the costs of familiarizing consum32. For example, Esther Dyson is a famous Internet guru who wrote numerous articles and
books on the Internet. Yet, even she was deprived of the right to use her name aa her domain name.
Now the domain name <estherdyson.com> cannot be registered. Other celebrities who were con
fronted with a similar problem include Brad Piu, Elton John, and Courtney Love. The names of the
deceased Kurt Cobain and Elvis Presley have also been appropriated. Su Howard Siegel &. Steven R.
Doran, Chtuing Down CybersqUiltters Who Register Celebrity Domain Names, 15 No. 12 ENT. L &:
F1N. 1 (2000 ).
33. To the best of my knowledge, very few businesses, if any, elected the third alternative, at
least initially.
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ers with a new domain name that is different from, and often unrelated
to, the company's trademark may be much higher than the cost of estab
lishing the trademark itself. In fact, consumers' familiarity with the
trademark makes it more difficult for them to accept the new domain
name, as well as to adjust to the fact that they cannot use the trademark
to reach the company's website. Furthermore, even if a company is suc
cessful in establishing a new domain name, it will still be disadvantaged
vis-a-vis its competitors because this company will bear the additional
cost of promoting both its trademark and its domain name in the future.
A company whose domain name differs from its trademark foregoes the
economies of scale that are available to companies that use their trade
mark as their domain name.
While the costs of establishing a new domain name are clearly sub
stantial, the cost of ceding control of a trademark to a third party may
prove to be even higher. Domain name appropriators may impose four
types of costs on trademark owners. I enumerate those costs in the order
of the severity of their impact on trademark owners.
·

First, the domain-name registrant may passively store the domain
name and not use it at all. Doing so yields no positive returns to the do
main-name registrant. Yet this strategy imposes a cost on the trademark
owner as it· prevents her from using an extremely valuable mode of
communication in interacting with her customers. Furthermore, the in
ability of the trademark owner to use the mark in on-line commerce may
frustrate customers and, at the margin, prod some of them to switch to
other products and services.34 In a medium of commerce that is predi
cated on speed, in which the attention span of users is extremely short,
any delay or friction may prove very costly.35
Second, the domain-name registrant can use the domain name to
generate revenues from advertising. This, for example, was how Brian
McKiernan elected to use the vaunted domain name <newyorkyan
kees.com>. In this business model, the domain-name registrant operates
an advertisement site that sells advertisement space to other business,
with the domain name serving as bait to attract customers, or "eye
bal1s,"36 to her site. In many cases, these customers will find themselves
"trapped" or "mousetrapped" in the website, unable to el'it without

34. The ability to bring customers speedily to one's website is key to success in e-commerce. As
Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian point out, "the most popular Web sites belong to the search engines,
those devi<:es that allow people to find information they value and ignore the rest." CARL SHAPIRO&.
HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 6 (1999).

35. As the Nobel Prize Laureate, economist Herbet Simon put it: "[A] wealth of information
creates a poverty of attention." Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organir.ations for an Information·Rich
World, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNIC ATIONS, AND TilE PUBLIC INTEREST 37-52 (Martin Greenberger
ed., 1971), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS OF COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION 187, 190 (Donald
M. Lam berton ed., 1996).
36. The term "eyeballs" signifies "visitors" in the cyberspace vernacular.
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clicking on a succession of ads.37 The impact of this strategy to the
trademark owner may be quite devastating. Customers who get mouse
trapped once may never again seek to transact on-line with the trade
mark owner whose site they could not find, choosing to transact instead
with competing businesses whose sites could be located more readily.
Third, the domain-name registrant may use the domain name to op
erate a website whose content- typically adult entertainment-may
sully the reputation of the trademark owner. Such a use threatened the
reputation of an established toy manufacturer, Hasbro, Inc., which has
held a forty-seven-year trademark on the children's board game,
"Candyland." Hasbro was stunned to find out that Internet Entertain
ment Group, Inc. registered the domain name <www.candyland.com>,
which it used as an on-line porn page.38 Such reputation-ruining uses are
advantageous for the domain-name registrant for two main reasons.
First, uses such as adult sites are often highly profitable. Second, uses
that adversely affect the reputation of the trademark owner's business
pressure the trademark owner to buy back the domain name.39
Finally, the domain-name registrant may operate a site directly
competing with the business of the trademark owner. Returning to my
original hypothetical, Charlie Klein, having secured the domain name
<ck.com>, could start his own line of fragrances that would compete with
those of Calvin. This strategy presents a direct challenge to the trade
mark owner's market share and may result in a substantial drop in reve
nues for the trademark owner.40
Given the costs and risks implicated by the option of establishing a
new domain name, businesses will be extremely reluctant to surrender
their trademarks to third parties for e-commerce purposes, and establish
in their stead new domain names.

B.

Initiating Legal Action

The second strategy established businesses can adopt against do
main-name registrants is to initiate legal action. Rather than cede their
valuable marks, trademark owners can turn to the legal system in an at37. See Shields v. Zuccarini, 89 F. Supp. 2d 634, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (enjoining defendant from
operating websites that trapped or Kmousetrapped" visitors).
38. See Paul M. Eng & Marsha Johnston, Get Your Hands Off My .Com, Bus. WK., July 28,
1997,at88.
39. Of course, this strategy may backfire and prompt the trademark owner to take legal action
against the domain-name registrant in order to regain the right to use the domain name. This is what
happened in the dispute between Hasbro and lEO. Hasbro sued lEO for trademark dilution and ul
timately prevailed on its lawsuit. See Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD,
1996 WL 84853, at •t (W.O. Wash. Feb. 9, 1996). I discuss the litigation option in greater detail else
where in this piece. See infra Part II.B.
40. In such cases, the trademark owner may have a cause of action against the domain-name
registrant for trademark infringement. It bears emphasis, however, that the domain-name registrant
can diminish, and even eliminate, her potential trademark liability by adopting a distinct trademark.
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
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t empt to regain the lost goods. Trademark law and the law of torts pro
vide trademark owners with an impressive arsenal of causes of action
a gainst domain-name registrants, the most salient of which are trade
mark infringement, trademark dilution, and unfair competition.41
Yet, the litigation option has several drawbacks. First, legal action
is time-consuming and costly.42 Disputes over domain names may take
years to resolve, and as long as the dispute lingers the domain name can
not be used. This problem renders the legal action option irrelevant to
many businesses. Given the speed at which e-commerce develops, busi
nesses can ill-afford delays in launching their on-line operations. A busi
ness that decides to engage in e-commerce needs a domain name right
away. Thus, despite the pitfalls of this strategy, it makes more sense for
most businesses to adopt a new domain name rather than wait for the le
gal system to determine the status of the disputed domain name.
Moreover, initiating legal action exposes established businesses to
potential reputational harms. In this context, the public often views the
domain-name registrant as a David fighting a Goliath, and in the best
tradition of American sports, it sides with the domain-name registrant.
The dispute between eToys and Etoy is a case in point.43 eToys, the
Web's leading toy retailer, resolved to bring a trademark infringement
suit against Etoy, a European group of conceptual artists, for using a con
fusingly s.imilar name to that of eToys. Of particular concern to eToys
was the fact that Etoy's website contained profane language and violent
graphic images. However, eToys was forced to reverse its decision to
seek legal action after they received "'lots and lots of communications
that urged [themJ to find a way to coexist with Etoy."'44
In other cases, the reputational harm may come not from the public,
but from the domain-name holder who attempts to raise public support.

41. A claim of trademark infringement requires a showing that the allegedly infringing use will
likely cause consumer confusion. See 1' U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994 &: Supp. IV 1998). A claim of trade
mark dilution requires a showing that the challenged use "dilutes" the value of a trademark. See id. §
1125(<:)(2). Finally, an unfair competition claim arises whenever a person, in a �ommercial sening,
makes false or misleading representations as to the origin of goods and services or a fact, and as a re·
suit consumer confusion is likely to occur. See id. § 1125(a)(l). For a review of the case law prior to
Nuvemlict 1999, liCe DaviJ Yan, Nut<:, Virtual Reuiiiy. Cun We Riu'f: Trademurk L.zw io Surf Cybet·
space'!, 10 FORDHAM lNTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 773, 795-803 (2000) .
Ironically, none of the traditional causes of action is readily applicable to warehousers, who charac·
teristicaUy do not use the names they register. Faced with this problem, the court in Panavision lnt'l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998), went to great lengths to find for the plaintiff on a
trademark-dilution claim. Stretching the conventional meaning of dilution, the court established the
defendant's practice of selling domain names back to the relevant trademark owners constituted a
commercial use. See id. at 1326-27.
42. For a recent review of the costs of litigation, see Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How
the Markel for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953 (2000) .
43. See Matthew Mirapaul, An and Co1111Mrce Collide Online as eToys Tries to Share What It
Sees as Its Turf with an Ans Group, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1999, at C3.
44. /d.; see also Steve Kettmann, Victory for Etoy Is at Hand, at http://www.wired.com/newsl
politicsl0,1283,33907,00.html (Jan. 26, 2000) (discussing settlement between the toy company and the
Internet artists) (on file with the UniVt!rsity of Illinois Law Review).

222

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2001

A smear campaign against the trademark owner is a potent defense
strategy available to domain-name registrants. Shields v. Zuccarim""5
provides an extreme example of this strategy. In this case, the plaintiff,
Shields, a famous cartoonist, brought a lawsuit against the defendant,
Zuccarini, claiming various violations of his intellectual property rights.46
In response to the lawsuit, the defendant posted a "political protest" on
the five websites he owned, alleging that plaintiff, in his cartoons, subver
sively incites kids "to join in the killing and mutilation [of animals].'047
Furthermore, he p resented himself as the defender of the public who
would go to great lengths to protect innocent children, this notwithstand
ing the fact that he registered several sexually explicit domain names.48
Although Shields ultimately prevailed in court, he, no doubt, suffered a
reputational harm as a result of his decision to litigate.49
C.

Negotiating a Consensual Transfer

The third, and final, option available to trademark owners who seek
to regain control over a domain name is to negotiate a voluntary transfer.
At first glance, it would appear that disputes over domain names lend
themselves to Coasean bargaining. There are only two parties involved,
and the cost of negotiating is low.50 Alas, the existence of just one seller
and one buyer raises the problem of "bilateral monopoly."51 In bilateral
monopoly cases, the price of the transaction subject cannot be deter
mined by reference to the market price or any other external pricing
mechanism.52 Instead, the price of the transaction depends on the rela
tive bargaining positions and bargaining skills of the parties to the trans
action.53
When the price of the transaction is not readily ascertainable, each
of the parties to the negotiation will try to capture the lion's share of the
bargaining surplus by strategically shading her offer. Consider the dis
pute between Ivan Wong and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.
(MSDW) over the domain name <msdwonline.com>. MSDW offered
Wong $10,000 for the domain name, an offer that struck Wong as ridicu
lously low."' In his response to the offer, he indicated to MSDW that, in
his valuation, the coveted domain name is worth hundreds of thousands

45. 89 F. Supp. 2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
See id. at 636.
47. !d. at 635.
48. See id. at 636.
49. See id. at 642.
50. See Cooter, supra note 22, at 17.
51. See Merges, supra note 22, at 265�.
52. See Cooter, supra note 22, at 17-18.
S3. See Merges, supra note 22, at 2660-67.
S4. See McGeehan & Richtel, supra note l, at Al.
46.
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of dollars.55 Not surprisingly, the negotiation broke down, and legal ac
tion ensued.56
But which valuation was correct? Which party is to be blamed for
the impasse? As is the case with all bilateral monopoly situations, there
is no way to know. The trademark owner is, in most cases, the only pos
sible buyer of the domain name. Consequently, the price of the domain
name equals the value the trademark owner assigns to the disputed
name.S7 Yet, this information is unknown to, and unverifiable by, the
domain-name holder. The informational conundrum is further compli
cated by the fact that the trademar.k owner can often use alternative, al
beit inferior, domain names. For example, MSDW could use the name
<msonline.com>- instead of <msdwonline.com>-as its domain name.
Thus, the price of a domain name is essentially the difference between
the value of the disputed name to the trademark owner and the value of
the next available alternative.sa But the domain-name registrant cannot
access this information, and has no way of finding it out.
In this informational haze, the domain-name holder is highly likely
to overstate her claim. Two cognitive biases are responsible for this re
sult. The first is known as the "endowment effect."59 The second is "ex
cessive optimism" regarding the probability of hoped-for events.150 The
endowment effect causes persons to overvalue their entitlements. Ac
cordingly, in the present context, the asking price of the domain-name
holder will be higher than the objective value of the name. Furthermore,
the excessive optimism heuristic will prompt the domain-name owner to
overly discount the probability of a negotiation breakdown. The combi-

55.

Seeid.
Suid.
57. In principle, the domain-name registrant can also try to sell the domain name to the trade
mark owner's rivals. However, I am not aware of any real world cases involving this strate8)'.
58. This determination is further complicated by the fact that many of the close substitutes of a
domain name have often been appropriated as well, and the price of those substitutes may only be
determined through negotiation with the appropriators.
59. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowmem Elfecl, Loss Aversion, and StaiW
Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (defining the "endowment effect" as a behavior in which
"peopie often demand much more to g1ve up an object than they wouid be wiiiing to pay to acqUire
it"); Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effea and lhe Coase Theorem, 98
J. POL. EcON . 1325 (1990) (concluding that endowment effects are not easily alte.red by experience);
Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,]. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 1 (1980)
(examining ways in which consumers deviate rrom rational economic models). On the impact of the
endowment effect on legal policymaking, see Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to
Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Russell
Korobkin, Note, Policym��king and the Offer/Asking Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficitnt Entitle
ment Allocation, 46 S TAN . L. REV 663 (1994).
60. See generally Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The
Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. EcoN. PER SP. 109, 119-21 (1997); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver
sky, Conflicl Resolution: A Cognitive Perspecrive, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44, 46-50
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1182-83 (1997); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Ufe Evtnts, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC PsYCHOL. 806 (1980).

56.
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nation of these biases provides a powerful explanation for the frequent
bargaining failures we witness in this context.
In sum, none of the three alternatives available to the trademark
owner adequately addresses her plight. All three alternatives create un
certainty, implicate considerable costs, and are incapable of resolving the
underlying dispute in a timely fashion. The failure of conventional legal
and market mechanisms adequately to resolve disputes over domain
names necessitates a new approach to the problem.
III. THE LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS
The shortcomings of the three alternatives discussed - establishing
a new domain name, taking legal action, and negotiating a voluntary
transfer -have led established businesses to seek innovative legal and
institutional solutions to alleviate their plight. The search has resulted in
the enactment of two new legal mechanisms: The Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) of 1999, and ICANN's Rules for Uni
form Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.
A.

The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act

The ACPA became law on November 29, 1999. It was enacted to
accomplish three goals: "[1] protect consumers and American busi
nesses . . . [2] promote the growth of online commerce, and . . . [3] pro
vide clarity . . . for trademark owners.'�1 The main "evil" targeted by the
ACPA is the practice of "bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive
marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the good
will associated with such marks -a practice commonly referred to as 'cy
bersquatting."�2 To contain this practice, the ACPA forbids the bad
faith registering, trafficking, or use of a domain name identical or confus
ingly similar to a distinct or famous trademark.63
The ACPA requires courts to make three determinations. First, the
court has to determine whether the mark lying at the heart of the dispute
was distinct or famous at the time the domain name was registered.64
Second, the court must determine whether the domain name is identical

S. REP. No. 1()6.140, at 4 ( 1999).
/d. ; see also Sporty's Farm, LL.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.Jd 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000).
63. See S REP. No. 106-140, at 2 ( 1999) .
64. lS U.S.C.A. § 112S(d)(1)(A)(ii) enables a cause of action against a person who, in bad raith,
"registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that" is "identical or confusingly similar to" a mark that is
(I) "distinctive" or (II) "famous" at the time the domain name is registered.
Sub5ection
1 12S(d)(l)(A)(ii)(III) provides a cause of action in two limited situations. Under this subsection, a
suit can be brought against a person who registers a domain name that is "a trademark, word, or name
protected by" 18 U.S.C. § 706 (protecting the sign of the Red Cross), or 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (protecting
the name, symbol, emblem and words associated with the "United States Olympic Committee"). 15
U.S.C.A. § 1 12S(d)(l)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 2000).
61.
62

.
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or confusingly similar to the mark." Finally, the court must decide
whether the domain-name registrant acted in bad faith, with an intent to
commercially exploit the similarity between the domain name and the
mark.66
Of these three determinations the last one is clearly the hardest.
Bad faith and intent are subjective motivations unknown to external ob
servers. Thus, to facilitate the task somewhat, the act lists nine factors to
be considered by the court when determining the intent of domain-name
registrants. These factors include: (1) the intellectual property of the
registrant in the disputed name; (2) the personal and legal affiliation of
the registrant to the name; (3) prior use of the name by the registrant in
connection with goods and services; ( 4) the registrant's bona fide non
commercial or fair use of the mark ·in her site; (5) the registrant's intent
to subvert the business of the trademark owner; (6) attempts by the reg
istrant to transfer the name for fmancial gain; (7) provision of misleading
contact information by the registrant at the time of registration; (8)
"warehousing" by the registrant; and (9) the degree of distinctiveness of
the disputed mark.67 However, the act then states that no bad faith
should be found if the registrant "believed, and had reasonable grounds
to believe that the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise
Iawful. "68
If bad faith on the part of the domain-name registrant is established,
the court "may order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name
or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark.'t69 In addi
tion, the court has discretion to award the trademark owner up to
$100,000 in statutory damages per each domain name found to be in in
fringement of the mark.70

B.

The Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy

An alternative recourse available to a trademark owner is arbitra
tion under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy.71 The
UDRP was adopted by ICANN on August 26, 1999, and is binding upon
all ICANN-approved registrars, who must accept the UDRP to receive
6S.

66.
67.

68.
69.

See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 12S(d)(l)(A)(ii)(I)-{II).
See id. § 1 12S(d)(1)(A)(i).
See id. § 1 12S(d)(l)(B)(i).
/d. § 1 125(d)(l)(B)(ii).
/d. § 1 125(d)(1)(q.
/d. § 11 17(d). The statutory damages serve two purposes. First, they ensure that the trade

70.
mark owner receives jll5t compensation !or the loss she suffered Second, they serve a deterrent effecL
The threat of losing $100,000 may induce domain-name registrants, especially risk averse ones, to set
tle cases ra ther than litigate them until the end
71. See UORP, supra no te 14. To implement UORP, ICANN adopted The Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (RUORP), which establish the procedural rules of dispute
re11olution under UORP. See ICANN, Rules for Umform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, al
http://www.icann.org/udrpludrp-rules-24oct99.htm (last updated Jan. 3, 2000) (on file with the Univer
.

sity of/llillois Law Review).
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accreditation.72 Under the UDRP, disputes concerning domain names
are submitted to an ICANN-approved dispute-resolution service pro
vider/3 who appoints an "Administrative Panel" to determine the respec
tive rights of the parties to the disputed name.
Although primarily enacted to address cybersquatting, the UDRP
does not define cybersquatting; instead, it describes the types of disputes
to which it applies. Paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP defines "Applicable
Disputes" as disputes in which the respondent: (1) registered a domain
name identical or confusingly similar to the complainant's trademark or
service mark; (2) has no legitimate interests in the domain name; and (3)
appropriated and used the domain name in "bad faith. "74 These ele
ments are cumulative, and thus the complainant-trademark owner must
prove that all three are present for the UDRP to apply.7s
The UDRP then lists four factors that may support a bad-faith find
ing. Paragraph 4(b) provides that bad faith shall be inferred if the re
spondent domain-name owner: {1) has appropriated the domain name
primarily to extract consideration from the trademark owner, or her
competitor, in exchange for its transfer; (2) has repeatedly registered
domain names to bar trademark owners from using their marks as their
domain name; (3) has registered the domain name primarily for the pur
pose of disrupting the business of a competitor; or (4) has intentionally
attempted to free-ride on the trademark owner's goodwill by attracting
confused consumers to her site.76 However, the UDRP then states that
demonstrable preparation to use a domain name in connection with a
bona fide offering of goods or services could defeat a bad-faith allega
tion.77
As for remedies, in the case of a ruling for the trademark owner, the
appointed panel may order the cancellation of the disputed domain
name, or that the domain name be transferred to the trademark owner.78
C.

The Misguided Reliance on Good Faith

Although both the ACPA and the UDRP are steps in the right di
rection, neither of them ultimately provides a satisfactory framework for
72 See ICANN, Resolutions Approved by rhe Board Santiago Meeting, Aug. 26, 1999, ar
http://www.icann.org/santiago/santiago-resolutions.htm (last updated Aug. 28, 1999) (on file with the
University of /llinois Law Review). By March 2000, ICANN had accredited more than 90 registrars.
See Mitchell-Stephens, supra note 30, at l.v.
73. See UDRP. supra note 14, U 4-4(a). So far, ICANN approved four dispute resolution pro
viders: WIPO, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, eResolution, and the National Arbitration
Forum. See ICANN Approved Providers List, at http://www .icann.org/udrp/approved-providers.htm
(page updated Oct. l7, 2000) (on file with the University of Illinois lAw Review).
74. UDRP, supra note 14, 'f 4(a).
15. See id.
76. See id. 'f 4(b).
77. See id. 'I 4(c).
78. See id. If 4(i).
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resolving disputes between domain name and trademark owners. Both
solutions are vague, time consuming, and worse, neither of them guaran
tees efficient allocation of resources. In both cases, these Daws are at
tributable to one cause: reliance on the "good-faith" standard. Both the
ACPA and the UDRP focus on the good, or bad, faith of the domain
name registrant in determining the entitlement to the domain name.
Good faith, however, is a notoriously fuzzy determinant, unobservable to
third parties. To overcome this problem, both the ACPA and the UDRP
focus on various external indications that undermine or support good
faith. But this strategy fails to carry the day.

Consider the ACPA, first. It lists nine factors to be considered. by
the courts in determining good faith. This enumeration is a perfect ex
ample of the adage "more is less." As is often the case with multifactor
lists, the factors enumerated are highly likely to conDict with one another
i n particular cases. For example, how should a court decide a case in
which the domain-name registrant "warehoused" multiple domain
names, yet, the particular name at the heart of the dispute represents her
last name? Which factor should be given more weight, if all the other
f actors are moot? One can think of many other examples, involving any
number of factors pulling in opposite directions. Yet, the act provides no
guidance as to how such conflicts should be resolved. To muddy the wa
ters further, after listing the nine factors courts must consider in deter
mining bad faith, the ACPA states that no bad faith should be found if
the registrant "believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the
use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful. "79 The bal
ancing test, in which the ACPA requires courts to engage, makes it very
difficult for the parties to determine their respective entitlements to the
domain name ex ante, forcing them to rely on adjudication as the pri
mary means of ascertaining their rights.
The UDRP fares only marginally better on this count. Although

the UDRP contains a shorter list of external factors attesting to the in
tent of the domain-name registrant, the four-factor list it provides does
not escape the problem of internal conDicts. For example, it is impossi
ble to discern whether a registrant who registered her legal name did so
to s11bvert the trademark owner's husines.s, or for another, legitimate
purpose. Consider again the hypothetical example of Charlie Klein who
registers the domain name <ck.com>. Charlie's motivation might be be
nign or subversive - or most likely a combination of the two - but unless
Charlie openly admits his motivation, it is impossible to discern his true
motivation. Furthermore, under the UDRP, demonstrable preparation
to use the name in trade creates a good-faith presumption. Although this
provision clearly protects the reliance interest of the domain-name regis
trant, it is unclear how much reliance is necessary for the presumption to

79.

15 U.S.C.A. §

U2S(d)(l)(B)(ii) (West

Supp. 2000).
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arise. If very minimal preparation suffices, then any bad-faith allegation
may be easily defeated. If the necessary reliance is more substantial, the
UDRP induces wasteful reliance expenditures by domain-name regis
trants whose rights may be contested.
A second shortcoming of the ACPA and the UDRP is their inability
to resolve disputes instantaneously. Both litigation and arbitration are
time-consuming. The longer a domain name remains in the hands of the
registrant, the greater the harm to the trademark owner, as well as to in
nocent Web-surfers who seek to reach the trademark owner's site.
Moreover, the wait implicated by the ACPA and UDRP puts the trade
mark owner in a "commercial limbo." As long as the resolution process
is in progress, the trademark owner cannot use . the disputed name, but
investing in a new name may prove wasteful should the disputed name be
eventually restored to her. Worse yet, during this period, the trademark
owner will lose sales to competitors whose domain names are identical to
their marks.
Finally, and most importantly, due to their reliance on the good
faith standard neither the ACPA nor the UDRP guarantees an economi
cally efficient allocation of domain names. Economic efficiency seeks to
place assets in the hands of their highest value users at the least possible
cost. From an efficiency standpoint, a domain name, like any other re
source, should be allocated to the party who values it the most. Accord
ingly, in disputes over domain names, economic efficiency prescribes that
the name be granted to the party who places a higher value on the name.
Yet, because the good-faith standard focuses exclusively on the intent of
the registrant, it completely disregards efficiency concerns. Assume that
Irene, Bob, and Martha decide to launch an on-line music portal. For
want of a better name, or at least so they allege, they register the domain
name <IBM.com>. Clearly, the value of the domain name <IBM.com>
to Irene, Bob, and Martha is a tiny fraction of its worth to IBM. Hence,
depriving mM of the right to use its trademark as its domain name is in
efficient. Moreover, it is inequitable; after all, IBM invested enormous
amounts of money in establishing its brand name and goodwill, and al
lowing the domain-name registrant to "free ride" on this investment is
outright unjust. Yet, if Irene, Bob, and Martha registered the domain
name first, mM would find relief neither in the ACPA nor in the
UDRP.80 Fortunately for IBM it controls the domain name <IBM.com>.
But other established businesses that were not so lucky will discover that
the existing legal solutions do not adequately protect them against so
phisticated domain name "hijackers." Under both existing dispute
resolution mechanisms, the fact that the domain name is much more

80. Of course, IBM could uy to buy back the domain name from Irene, Bob, and Martha, but Cor
the reasons explained in supra Part Il.C., postregistration negotiation is not a very promising option in
the present context.
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valuable to the trademark owner is irrelevant to the determination of the
relative rights of the parties. 81
·

On top of it all, the solutions employed by the ACPA and UDRP
are also problematic on fairness grounds. Both the ACPA and UDRP
rest on the principle of property rule protection.82 Under both, either the
domain-name registrant gets to retain the name, and the trademark
owner gets nothing; or, the trademark owner gets the domain name and
the domain-name registrant receives nothing.83 In other words, both so
lutions ·rely on a binary, all or nothing, regime, with the loser receiving no
compensation.84 This, however, seems inequitable, given that both the
trademark owner and the domain-name registrant who uses the name in
trade independently contribute to the value of the domain name. Thus, a
liability rule regime that entitles the losing party to some sort of compen
sation would effect a more equitable result. ·
The shortcomings of the existing legal solutions call for an alterna
tive resolution mechanism. In the next part, I will show that auction the
ory holds a superior solution to the challenge of domain name allocation,
one that avoids the pitfalls of the good-faith standard ·and is compatible
with the nature of e-commerce.
IV. AN AUCfiONING METHOD FOR REALLOCATING DOMAIN NAMES

Auctions are "stylized markets with well-defined rules. "85 For this
reason, auctions provide an effective vehicle for overcoming the problem
of asymmetric information. Properly designed, the auctioning process
.can induce auction participants to reveal their true valuations of the auc-

81. A recent dispute involving the celebrated artist "Sting" is a case in point. In a recent arbitra
tion proceeding, Sting was deprived of the right to use his stage name as his domain name, after Mi
chael Urvan, from Marietta, Georgia, registered the name c:sting.com> as the domain name of his
gambling site. The WJPO arbitration panel ruled that Sting failed to show bad faith on the part of
Urvan. See Sumner v. Urvan. No 02000-0596 (WJPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, Administra
tive Panel Decision, July 24, 2000), available at http:l/www.sting.com/WIPO_Decision.asp (on file with
the University of Illinois LAw Review)
82. See Guido Calabresi &. A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienabil
.

.

ity: One View of the Cathed,rnl. 85 HA!!V. L. ll..EV. 10!!9, 1002 (1972). Umkr the Calabteai
Melarnedian framework, property-rule protection forces potential "taltersM lo secure the consent of
the entitlement owner, and thus, allows her to determine the price of her entitlement. Liability-rule
protection, by contrast, allows potential "takers" to avail themselves of or:her people's entitlements as
long as they are willing to pay a collectively determined price that is usually set by a court, a legislator,

or an administrative agency. See UJ.
83. lf the losing party wishes to buy the domain name back, she wiU have to pay the asking price
of the winner.
84. The ACPA empowers the court to order the cancellation or transfer of the disputed domain
name. [n addition, it authorizes the court to award, at its discretion, between $10,000 and $100,000, in
statutory damages, and attorney's fees to the prevailing party. The remedies under the ICANN's
UDRP are limited to cancellation and transfer; no damages or attorney's fees can be awarded. See
Richard J. Grabowski, Adventures in Cyberspace, Strntegies for Securing and Protecting Your Firm 's
Domain Name, 17 No. 1 1 LEGAL TECH. NEWSL 7 (2000) .
85. ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCOON TO GAME THEORY 293

(2d ed. 1994).
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tion object, and thereby ensure efficient allocation of resources.

This

ability makes auctions especially attractive in thin market settings, in
which prices are not readily ascertainable. Given the lack of a natural
market for domain names, and that postregistration bargaining raises the
problem of bilateral monopoly, the application of auction theory to dis
putes over domain names is especially fitting. The remainder of this part
is divided into two sections. In section A, I will introduce and explain the
auction concepts that are relevant to my recommended proposal. Then,
in section B , I will construct an auctioning mechanism that effectively re
solves disputes over domain names.
A.

Terminology and Typology

Auctions are amenable to several classifications,86 four of which are
important for the purpose of this essay. First,. auctions can be classified
by the way the value of the auctioned object is determined.87 According ·
to this classification auctions come in three varieties: private-value auc
tions, common-value auctions, and correlated-value auctions.88 In a pri
vate-value auction, each bidder knows precisely how much she values the
auctioned obj ect, and her valuation does not depend on those of other
bidders.89 A bidder's valuation would be unaffected by learning of other
bidders' valuations. An example of a private-value auction is an art auc
tion in which the buyers intend never to resell.90 In a common-value auc
tion, by contrast, the "objective" value of the object is identical for all
bidders, but the valuations of the bidders differ as they reflect the private
information available to each bidder.91 An example of a common-value
auction is bidding on an oil lease. The value of the lease depends on the
amount of oil in the reservoir. Each bidder has an estimate as to what
that amount might be. Yet, this estimate may change in response to in
formational signals from other bidders. Finally, in a correlated-value
auction, the valuations of the bidders are correlated, but the values they
ascribe to the auctioned object may differ.92 As a practical matter, all
auctions in the real world are correlated-value.93
A second way to classify auctions is procedural, that is, by the way
the bidding process occurs. This classification breaks up auctions into

86.

For a general discussion, see id. at 293-95; Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the

Literature, 13 1. ECON. SURV.

227, 331-36 (1999).

87.

See RASMUSEN, supra note 85, at 293-94.

88.

See id.
See id. at

89.

294.

90. As Rasmusen points out, "{i)f there were resale, a bidder's valuation would depend on the
price at which he could resell, which would depend on other players valuations." /d.
91. See id. ; Klemperer, supra note 86, at 231.
92. See RAsMUSEN, supra note 85, at 294.
93. The common-value auction is a considered a special case of a correlated-value auction.
Thus, the existence of common-value auctions does not undermine the accuracy of the observation.
See id.
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two general types: open-bid auctions and sealed-bid auctions.94 In an
open-bid auction, the bidders announce their bids publicly.95 The typical
example of an open-bid auction is an oral auction. The · open bidding
provides bidders with updated information about their peers' valuations,
enabling each bidder to react to this information by adjusting her bid. In
a sealed-bid auction, each bidder has only one chance to bid and revise
the bid amount in response to the bids of others.96 Accordingly, the in
forma tional basis of the bidders in a sealed-bid auction is different from
that o f the bidders in an open auction.
A third way to classify auctions is by the price the winner of the auc
tion has to pay.97 This classification applies only to sealed-bid auctions,
dividing them into first-price, and second-price auctions. In a first-price,
sealed-bid auction, the highest bidder wins the auction and pays her ac
tual bid. Thus, her best strategy is to try an outbid by the smallest mar
gin possible the second highest bidder. In a second-price, sealed-bid auc
tion, also known a "Vickrey auction,"98 the highest bidder wins the
auction but pays the second highest bid. In this type of auction, a bid
der's best strategy is to bid her true valuation because the price she might
eventually pay does not depend on her bid; the bid only determines who
wins the auction.119 Thus, a Vickrey auction eliminates the incentive to
bid strategically, and induces truthful bidding.
Finally, it is useful to distinguish between "standard auctions" and
"internal auctions.." In a standard auction, a seller auctions off an object,
and a group of buyers competes for the right to buy it.100 In· principle,
any person can bid on the auctioned object, with the highest bidder re
ceiving the object if her bid exceeds the asking price. The roles of
"seller" and "buyer" are predefined and immutable. In an internal auc
tion, by contrast, the group of participants is limited to persons who have
a stake in, or a potential entitlement to, the auction object. For example,
the group of eligible participants may be comprised of the partners in a
partnership that is about to be dissolved and sold;101 a polluter and a

94.

See id. at 294-98 (dividing auctions by four different rule sets: ( 1 ) English (first-price, open-

cry); (2) First-price, sealed-bid; (3) Vickery (second-price, sealed-bid); and (4) Dutch (descen<l!ng)).

S� KJ;:mperilr, iiUpru iiUie 80, at 2Ji-32.
See id. at 232.
97. See RASMUSEN, supra note 85, at 295-97 (distinguishing between first-price, open-cry and
sealed-bid auctions and second-price, sealed or "Vickery" bids); see also Klemperer, supra note 86, at
232-33.
98. William Vickrey, after whom the second-price, sealed-bid auction is called, has been one of
the pioneers of the theoretical study of auctions. His article, CoiUIIenpeculation, Auctiom, and Com·
petilive Se4led Tenders, is considered a classic. William Vickrey, CoU111enpeculati01l, Auctiom, and
Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FrN. 8 (1961).
99. It is important to note that there is no dominant bidding strategy in a sealed-bid, first-price
auction. See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. LJTERATIJRE
699, 708 (1987).
100. See id. at 701-03.
101. See Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving a Parrnenhip Efficiemly, 55 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615
( 1 987).
95.
96.
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nearby neighbor who seeks to enjoin the pollution;102 and a domain-name
appropriator and a trademark owner who claims the name. Further
more, because all participants have some claim to the auctioned object, it
is unclear, ex ante, who the b uyer is and who the seller is. Initially, each
participant is both a potential buyer and a potential seller, and only at
the end of the auction does it become clear who sells and who buys. At
that point, the winner of the auction gains an unqualified entitlement to
the auctioned object, free of any claims from other auction partici
pants.103
B.

The Mechanism Design

To qualify for the auction, a domain-name owner will have to satisfy
two prerequisites. First, she will have to show that she bas registered not
more than three domain names.104 Second, she will have to show that she
is actually using the name in e-cornmerce.105 These preliminary require
ments are designed to screen out "warehousers" and other free riders
who appropriate domain names for the sole purpose of selling them back
to trademark owners. S uch transfers do not create any new social value;
on the contrary, they impose a cost on society by impeding commerce
and fomenting litigation. Thus, nonproductive uses of domain names
should be discouraged. Only domain-name registrants who use the name
in e-cornmerce, and thereby put the domain name to a productive use,
should be entitled to bid on the domain name. In all other cases, the
domain name should simply be returned to the trademark owner at no
cost.Ulti
Once the pool of the legitimate domain owners has been estab
lished, a trademark owner seeking to reclaim a domain name would be
entitled to force the domain-name owner into a sealed-bid bilateral auc-

102 See Ian Ayres & J. M. Ballda, Legal Emitlemenrs as Auctions: Propmy Rulu, UabiJiJy
Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 700-16 (1996).
103. For discussion of the pote11ti� effic;iellcy etfe� of 1\uctioiiS with�>ut pn-4"fin!M '!t'llen, se�

WiJJWn Samuelson, A Cammml on the Cout TM<m:m, ill GAME· THEORETIC MoDELS OF
(Alvin E. Roth ed., 1985). Samuelson posits that preassigning the entitle
ment to any bidder may adversely affect the efficient allocation of resources, and proposes instead a
mechanism in which the bidders are "joint owners of the right." /d. at 331.
104. The purpose of the limitation is to ensure the exclusion of warehousers. Exceptions should
be made in cases involving a larger number of related domsin names, for example, variations on the
same name. Admittedly, the proposed number (three) is arbitrary, and thus the auction administrator
should be granted discretion to deviate from this rule in appropria te cases.
105. Naturally, the first requirement should be modified in cases involving a domain-name regi$
trant with several businesses. In such cases, the rule should be one domain name per business.
106. To be sure, one could argue that the trademark owner who receives the domain name should
reimburse the domsin-name registrant for the registration fees -currently $70 for two years. How
ever, to deter the practice of warehousing, no reimbursement should be granted in this case. In fact, it
may even be necessary to impose a somewhat greater penalty on warehousers to discourage them from

BARGAINING 321, 325-31

engaging in this activity.
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tion,107 in which the name would be auctioned off between the parties.108
The auctioning process should proceed in accordance with the following
rules: .
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid.
(b) If the trademark owner submits the higher bid, she will get
the domain name for a price equal to the bid of the domain-name
registrant.
.
·

(c) If; by contrast, the domain-name owner submits a bid equal
to, or higher than the bid of the trademark owner, she will retain
the domain name but she will have to pay the amount of her bid to
the trademark owner.
(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal
ienable for a period of two years.

The proposed mechanism rests on the assumption that the domain
name is considerably more valuable to the trademark owner than it is to
the domain-na.me registrant.109 Furthermore, it presupposes that the domain-name registrant, as a self-interest maximizer, will seek to exploit
the considerable disparity in value by trying to appropriate the lion's
share of the difference in value. Although the average trademark owner
will treat the auction as a "private-value auction," the domain-name reg
istrant will view the auction as a "correlated-value auction." And, al
though generally the distribution of the bargaining surplus between the
parties is not a concern per se, if the domain-name registrant mistakenly
overplays h�r hand and ou�bids the trademark owner, efficiency will be
harmed. To counter this possibility, the mechanism design subjects the
parties to different bidding rules. The result is an asymmetric bilateral
auction.
Rule (a) is intended to assure the parties' ability to pay the amounts
they bid; This concern is particularly pertinent in the case of the· domain
name registrant who will exaggerate her bid in the absence of a bond re
quirement. Without a bond requirement, the domain-name registrant
could bid any amount, and then, if the outcome of the auction were not
to her liking, claim that she cannot afford to pay . 1 10 The bond require107. Although in principle the proposed mechani!lm is readily applicable to disputes of this lrind, I
believe that it should not be made available to trademark owners whose marks were established after
the registration of an identical or confusingly similar domain name. This is because such trademark
owners could have easily found out of the existence of the domain-name registrant by running a very
simple search, and are, thus, the least cost avoiders. For this reason, it is quite unlikely that disputes of
this kind will actually arise.
108. Procedurally, the auctioning process can be administered by any of ICANN's accredited do
main-name registrars. The trademark owner initiating the process will notify the challenged domain
name registrant and the relevant administrator of the impending challenge, and the auction can be
held shortly thereafter.
109. I revisit this ass umption i.nfro Part IV.C. There, I add the assumption that the domain-name
registrant may in fact be the higher-value user, and modify the auctioning mechanism to account for
this possibility.
1 10. A different way to overcome the inability to pay problem is to provide that inability to pay
would result in automatic forfeiture of the domain name, and its transfer to the other party.

·
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ment alleviates this concern, and thus, lends credibility to the bidding
process. Furthermore, the bond requirement may force many domain
name appropriators to seek external validation of the valuations prior to
bidding. Given that the amounts involved are quite considerable, many
domain-name owners would have to borrow money from financial insti
tutions to satisfy the bond requirement. This, in turn, would provide
them with the opportunity to consult financial experts about the value of
the name.
Rule (b) is crafted to induce the trademark owner to bid truthfully.
Effectively, this rule turns the auction into a Vickery auction for the
trademark owner, thereby guaranteeing her that her bid will have no ef
fect on the price she pays if she wins. In the case of domain names, the
efficient allocation of resources may be thwarted either because the do
main-name owner strategically overrepresents her valuation, out of hope
of winning a disproportionate share of the bargaining surplus, or because
the trademark owner strategically underrepresents her valuation out of
fear of surrendering too much of the bargaining surplus. Rules (a) and
(c) intend to deal with the former risk; rule (b) is designed to deal with
the latter. Because in a Vickery auction the winner does not pay the
amount she bid but rather the second highest amount, the trademark
owner's dominant strategy is to bid her true valuation, and, in the likely
case of a victory, pay the bid amount of the domain-name owner. Ac
cordingly, if Tammy, the trademark owner, bid $100,000 (her true valua
tion), and Diana, the domain-name registrant, bid $30,000, then Tammy
will get the domain name for the price of $30,000.
Rule (c) aims at further restraining the ability of the domain-name
registrant to bid strategically. Although the bond requirement forces the
domain-name registrant to put her money where her bid is, it only par
tially restrains the ability of the domain-name owner to bid strategically.
After all, if the domain-name owner believes that there is a substantial
disparity in value between the parties, she will overrepresent her valua
tion to increase her payoff notwithstanding the bond requirement. While
designing the auction as a Vickery auction for the trademark owner en
sured truthful bidding by her, a similar tactic will not work for the do
main-name registrant simply because the domain-name owner knows she
is extremely unlikely to win. The goal of the domain-name registrant is
not to try and win the auction, but rather to extract as high a payoff as
possible by bidding strategically. Her bidding strategy will be to bid in
crementally below the trademark owner. To execute this strategy, the
domain-name owner needs to estimate accurately the valuation of the
trademark owner. However, because the bidding process is conducted
under imperfect information and the valuation of the trademark owner is
unobservable private knowledge, the domain-name owner may overes
timate the value of the name to the trademark owner and bid too high.
Thus, this bidding strategy runs the risk of distorting alJocative efficiency.
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Rule (c), in combination with rule (d), counters the domain-name
registrant's disposition to shade up her bid by introducing a "winner's
curse" into the auction.111 Unless the domain-name registrant really val
ues the name more highly, overbidding will result in her overpaying for a
name she would be happy to sell to the trademark owner. The fear of
having to pay the exaggerated bid in the case of a victory restrains the
motivation of the domain-name owner to overbid. Admittedly, rule (c)
will not induce the domain-name registrant to bid her private valua
tion - indeed, given that for the domain-name registrant this is a corre
lated value auction, there is no reason why she should.112· Importantly,
however, it practically eliminates the risk of the domain-name owner
mistakenly winning the auction.
To see this, consider the following example. Assume that Diana's
private valuation of the domain name she owns is $10,000. She estimates
that Tammy's valuation of the name ranges between $31 ,000 and
$100,000, with equal distribution. Assuming risk neutrality and random
drawing, and given rule (c), Diana's best strategy is to bid $30,000 , the
amount that promises her the highest expected payoff;113 bidding a higher
amount runs the risk of winning the auction, and thus, diminishes the ex
pected payoff. If Diana is risk averse, the amount of her bid would be
even lower.114
It is possible, of course, that the domain-name registrant would win
the auction not because she mistakenly overbid, but, simply, because she
is the higher-value user. In this case, awarding the domain name is the
efficient outcome, and the price she pays would compensate the trade
mark owner for the latter's contribution to the value of the name.
Finally, rule (d) preserves the integrity of the auction by rendering
the domain name inalienable for two years at the conclusion of the auc
tion.m Without this rule, the domain-name holder could risk an unfa
vorable outcome at the auction, and rely on post-auction negotiations to
secure a more propitious result. For example, if post-auction negotiation
were possible, Diana could bid $99,000, win the auction, and then, try to
sell the domain name to Tammy for $50,000. Rule {d) eliminates this
i i 1. As i expiain beiow, the "winner's curse� is magnified by ruie (a), which renders the outcome
of the auction immutable for a period of two years.
1 12. However, the inability to force the domain-name holder to bid her private valuation reduces
the incentive of the trademark owner to invest in the mark. In other words, the need to buy back do·
main names will lead trademark owners to invest less in their mark than they would otherwise.
1 13. I assume for the sake of simplicity that the bids must be in increments of one thousand.
1 14. The assumption of risk aversion is reasonable because only domain-name owners who use
the name in commerce are eligible to bid (warehousers are excluded at the preliminary stage). The
exclusion of warehousers implies that the domain-name registrants who qualify cannot effectively di·
versify away the risk of winning tbe auction, i.e., overpaying for the right to keep using the domain
name.
1 15. ln a similar vein, Ian Ayres and Kristen Madison pointed out that an inalienability restriction
can be used to combat strategic threats of inefficient performance i n contractual settings. See Ian
Ayres & Kristen Madison, Threatening lnefficielll Performance of Injunctions and Contracts, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 45, 54-56 ( 1999) .
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strategy. The inability to transfer the domain name outside of the auc
tion ensures the effectiveness of rules (a) through (c). Naturally, it also
eliminates the prospect of additional transaction costs.
However, rule (d) does not render the domain name inalienable in
perpetuity; it limits the inalienability period to two years. The two-year
period is sufficiently long to deter excessive greediness on the part of the
domain-name holder, yet it allows for the possibility that in the future
the relative values of the parties may change sufficiently to warrant a dif
ferent outcome.U6 It is possible, for example, that two years after the
auction, the business of the domain name's registrant will surpass the
value of the trademark owner's business, and the former would like to
buy the name back. In such a case, a second auction should be adminis
tered, but the rules should be changed to reflect the new reality.111
In sum, the asymmetric internal auction I propose overcomes the
problem of bilateral monopoly and promotes efficient allocation of re
sources. Furthermore, it accomplishes this at a minimal administrative
cost: the auction consists of a single iteration after which bargaining is
temporarily prohibited.118 The key to the effectiveness of the proposed
mechanism lies in the utilization of asymmetric bidding rules, which dis
incentivizes strategic posturing, and induces the parties to strike a Pareto
optimal deal: the winner gets the domain name, and the loser receives an
amount in excess of her private valuation of the asset.119

116. Admittedly, the two-year inalienabilily period is somewhat arbitrary. The inalienability pe·
riod may be shorter (e.g., one year) or longer (e.g., three years), so long as it effectively deten exces
sive greediness on the pan of domain-name holders, while allowing for change in the relative value of
the domain name to the panies.
1 1 7. Because the second auction occu rs in very different circumstances, I propose that the right
mechanism design is a symmetric Vickery auction. However, if the trademark owner wins the auction,
he should get the domain name for free. This is necessary because the domain-name owner may re·
quest a seoond auction only to get back at the trademark owner for depriving ber of the name in the
first auction.
118. These are the two advantages of my mechanism over that of Ayres and Balkin. Ayres and
Balkin derive their mechanism from the possibility of reciprocal takings. They posit that liability rules
can be viewed as truncated auctions. Based on this insight, they construct an auction mechanism for
allocating entitlements. Under their mechanism, the panics to a dispute are to enter a multistage in
ternal auction, in which each pany can raise her bid incrementlllly tQ surpass th.e bid of the other p�!'fy.
The party who made the last bid, te., the highcsl bidde r, wins the auction and gets the entitlement.
Su Ayres & Balkin, supra note 102, at 707-16. Ant. because Ayres and Balkin's mechanism requires
multiple reiterations it is more costly and time-consuming than the mechanism I propose. This is es
pecially true if the bidding panies can take some time off between rounds to reassess their bidding
strategies. As I already noted, expeditious resolution of disputes over domain names is panicularly
important because such disputes adversely affect innocent third parties, i.e., CO!lllumers and Web sud
ers. Second, because Ayres and Balkin do not require that the entitlement become inalienable at the
end of the auction, their mechanism is prone to abuse in the present context. A pany can intentionally
overbid and then rectify the unfavorable resu lt through post-auction negotiation. Importantly, the
overbidding party will know after the auction stage the valuation of the other bidder and will thus be
able to appropriate the entire bargaining surplus.
119. Recall that if the trademark owner loses she receives the bid of the domain-name holder,
which is higher than what she bid. If, on the other hand, the domain-name registrant loses, her payoff
will be higher than her private valuation of the name for the reasons explained above. See supra text
accompanying notes 1 10-12.
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Before concluding, I would like to address two potential challenges.
One might question the necessity of an auction and propose, instead, that
a superior way to attain efficient allocation of resources is simply to
award the name to the trademark owner without even holding an auc
tion. Because I assume that, on average, the trademark owner values the
domain name more highly, granting her the entitlement will, on average,
promote economic efficiency. This argument is flawed in three impor
tant respects. First, in some cases the domain-name holder's valuation
may be higher than that of the trademark owner. In such instances, effi
ciency requires that the domain name be allocated to the domain-name
holder. However, without an auction it is impossible to ascertain the true
valuations of the parties. Second, if the trademark owner does not have
to pay for the name, too many forced takings would occur. Exempted
from the need to compensate, trademark owners will take domain names
remotely similar to their mark and may even abuse their prerogative to
quash smaller competitors. For example, under a rule that does not re
quire compensation, Apple Computer will probably take all the domain
names that incorporate the term "apple" because doing so is costless.120
The compensation requirement forces the trademark owner to internal
ize the costs t}lat she would otherwise externalize on others. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, an uncompensated transfer of the domain
name to the trademark owner probably violates the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment, and, therefore, is likely to be unconstitutional.
The second challenge to my solution concerns the wisdom of pro
posing an ex post rather than an ex ante solution to the problem of con
flicting claims to domain names. The auction mechanism I construct in
this subsection is a remedial measure, operating ex post to resolve dis
putes over domain names after they arise. One might object that a better
solution to the problem may be to address the problem ex ante by de
signing a better registration process that will avoid the problem alto
gether. For example, trademark owners could have been awarded an
au tomatic right to use their marks as their domain names, and no one
else could register them. I focus on an ex post solution for two reasons.
First, the cost of administering a registration process that would avoid
disputes between trademark owners and domain-name registrants i!i
likely to be prohibitive. To begin with, there is no comprehensive regis
try of all existing trademarks. Also, one has to bear in mind that even if
trademark owners were given a preemptive right to register their marks
as their domain names, confusingly similar names could still be regis
tered. Second, and more importantly, the opportunity to adopt a better
registration system is long lost. Millions of domain names have been reg
istered under the less than perfect registration system currently in place.

120. See Jessica Utman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and tile Internet Domain Name Syscem, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 1.53 (2.000) (discussing the problem of allocating domain names to
trademark owners whose marks are identical or similar, e.g., Apple Computer and Apple Records)
.
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This system, on account of its imperfections, has engendered a slew of
disputes over domain names, and these disputes must be resolved. Thus,
any ex ante measure must be supplemented by an ex post measure to re
solve existing disputes.
C.

Variants

So far, I have assumed that the trademark owner values the dis�
puted name more highly than the domain-name registrant; or, put differ�
ently, that the value of the trademark owner's business exceeds that of
the domain-name registrant's business.121
However, in the Internet
economy this will not always be true. The assumption that established,
traditional businesses are necessarily more worthy than younger Internet
businesses is called into question by the new commercial realities. Dy
namic Internet startups are often worth (at least for a while) substantially
more than older trademarked business. While most of us automatically
associate the trademark "amazon" with the on-line book distributor
<amazon.com>, the trademark was first appropriated by a different
Amazon, the oldest feminist bookstore in the U.S.122 Such cases, raise
the concern of "reverse hijacking"; that is, the fear of trademark owners
attempting to "extort" successful Internet businesses.
With a slight modification, my proposed auction mechanism can ac
count for this scenario. If it is known that the domain-name registrant
assigns a higher value to the name than does the trademark owner, rules
(b) and (c) of the basic model should be reversed so that rule (b) would
apply to the domain-name registrant and rule (c) to the trademark
owner. This c hange can be effected by the auction administrator prior to
the commencement of the auction. To decide which rules to apply, the
auction administrator should look at the market valuations of the two
bidding firms and then apply rule (b) to the company with the higher
valuation and rule (c) to the one with the lower valuation.123
This insight can be generalized. Assume that X and Y are i nvolved
in a domain name dispute, and that the value of X's business is higher
than the value of Y's, such that Vex)>YcY)· To reflect this, the auction
rules should state as follows:
(a) Each bidder will post a bond in the amount of her bid.
(b) If X submits the higher bid, she will get the domain name for
a price equal to the bid of Y.
(c) If, by contrast, Y submits a bid equal to, or higher than X's, Y
will retain the domain name but she will have to pay the amount of
her bid to X.
121. It is reasonable to assume that the two values, i.e., the value of the business and the value of
the domain name to the business, are correlated.
122. See Litman, supra note 120, at 153.
123. The market valuations of the relevant businesses can -be based on the value of the stock if the
stock is traded and otherwise, financial reports and investment memos.
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(d) At the end of the auction, the domain name will become inal
ienable for a period of two years.
Changing the auction rules, as suggested, affects the distribution of
the "bargaining" surplus between the parties. While the original set of
rules was inherently biased in favor of trademark owners, the modified
rules avoid this systemic bias. Rather, from a distributive point of view,
they give more protection to the party with the higher business valua
tion - be it the trademark owner or the domain-name registrant.124
Finally, to safeguard against abuse by big businesses, the proposed
mechanism should only be employed when the disputed domain name is
either identical , or strikingly similar to the trademark at issue.1zs Adopt
ing a more lax standard of similarity may expose the mechanism to abuse
by big businesses that may assay to use the proposed auction mechanism
to extract payments from small businesses by frivolously challenging
their entitlement to their intellectual property. The point and purpose of
domain names is to enable potential customers to locate websites easily
and efficiently. There is no need to expand domain-name law beyond
this. Standard trademark law provides trademark owners with ample
ammunition to combat infringers, dilutors, and tarnishers.
D.

A Cautionary Note

I would like to end this essay on a cautionary note. It bears empha
sis that the solution I craft in this essay is intended to serve as a remedial,
transition mechanism. It seeks to resolve disputes between existing
trademark owners and domain-name hold�rs. This may be accomplished
by limiting the implementation of the auction, at least initially, to dis
putes involving trademarks and domain names that were established by a
certain date, e.g., June 1, 2001. Future trademark owners can effectively
sidestep conflict by selecting a previously unregistered domain name as
their trademark, thereby assuaging the problem of splintered intellectual
property rights. Also, the introduction of new Top Level Domains
(TLDs ), such as .firm and .store, should also help reduce the potential
for future conflict by relieving to some extent the demand for the .com
TLD.126
124. Of course, if one aims to promote small businesses at the expense of larger ones, one can
switch rules (b) and (c), so that rule (b) would apply to the lower-value business and rule (c) to the
higher-value one.
125. "Striking similarity" exists when there are only minor variations between the relevant trade
mark and the domain name, for example, "kinko" and "kinkos." It is important to emphasize that the
striking similarity standard is much strK:ter than the similarity necessary to prevail on a regular trade·
mark-infringement claim, let alone trademark dilution.
126. On November 16, 2000, ICANN announced its decision to introduce seven new Top Level
Domains: .biz, .info, .name, .pro, .museum, .aero, and .coop. See Oscar S. Cisneros, ICANN: The
Winners Are . . , WIRED, Nov. 16, 2000, available at http://www.wirednews.comlnews/politicsKI,l283,
40228,00.html (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review). As expected, the proposed change
is not without its critics. For example, Karl Auerbach, a Cisco Systems researcher who was recently
elected to the ICANN board "asserted that ICANN is trying to replace market competition, which
.
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It is noteworthy, however, that if the internal auctioning mechanism
developed in this essay will have proven successful, with some modifica
tions, it may serve to resolve many other disputes concerning Intellectual
Property. For example, it can be employed to settle disputes between
junior and senior trademark holders, original patentees and improvers,
and copyright owners and fair users.
V.

CONCLUSION

Auctions provide a potent tool for overcoming the twin problems of
private information and strategic posturing in negotiations. As such, auc
tions can be employed in a wide array of legal contexts, especially trans
actional ones. In this essay, I crafted an internal, sealed-bid auction with
asymmetric bidding rules to resolve disputes over domain names. I dem
onstrated that the proposed mechanism enhances efficient allocation of
domain names, as well as provides adequate compensation to the losing
party. Because in internal auctions it is the parties who determine their
payoffs, the loser is guaranteed an amount equal to, or in excess of, her
own private value at the end of the auction. Thus, my proposed mecha
nism promotes allocative efficiency, without sacrificing fairness. In addi
tion, the use of my proposal could effect a substantial reduction in dis
pute resolution costs, both in terms of money and time.
Due to their information-forcing property, one would expect auc
tions to be widely used in the information age; yet, insofar as the legal
system is concerned, auctions remain extremely underused. Rather than
exploring information-forcing mechanisms, legislators prefer to rely on
long-standing concepts, such as good faith, even when the ability of these
concepts to do the work is dubious. Relative to the existing solutions 
the ACPA and UDRP - the implementation of my proposal could have:
(1) improved the allocation of resources, (2) reduced dispute resolution
costs, and (3) saved the cost of enacting the ACPA.

should determine which domains succeed and fail." Chris Gaither, Agency to Vote on Web Domain
Names, N.Y. nMfS, Nov. 16, 2000, at C4. Furthermore, Economic Solutions, a St Louis·based com
pany that owns the rights to Belize's domain, .bz, requested a federal court to enjoin ICANN from
issuing .biz on the ground that the similarity between the two names violates its intellectual property
rights. Although the court denied Economic Solutions its request, the threat of additional lawsuits still
looms large. See id.

